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Abstract
This article reconstructs the evolution of societal and journalistic meta-discourse about the participation of ordinary citi-
zens in the news production process. We do so through a genealogy of what we call “participatory epistemology”, defined
here as a form of journalistic knowledge in which professional expertise is modified through public interaction. It is our
argument that the notion of “citizen participation in news process” has not simply functioned as a normative concept but
has rather carried with it a particular understanding of what journalists could reasonably know, and how their knowledge
could be enhanced by engaging with the public in order to produce journalistic work. By examining four key moments in
the evolution of participatory epistemology, as well as the discursive webs that have surrounded these moments, we aim
to demonstrate some of the factors which led a cherished and utopian concept to become a dark and dystopian one. In
this, we supplement the work of Quandt (2018) and add some historical flesh to the conceptual arguments of his article
on “dark participation”.
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1. Introduction
As Kreiss and Brennen (2016) have perceptively noted,
“participation” is one of the guiding normative values of
journalism in the digital age. “To overcome the indus-
trial production of journalism and culture”, they have ar-
gued “[journalism] reformers elevated participation as
a primary democratic value” (Kreiss & Brennen, 2016,
p. 301). This conclusion about the importance, and ul-
timate fragility, of the participatory concept is echoed
by Quandt (2018). In this article, we attempt to expand
on the manner by which this central value has evolved
and transformed over the course of the internet’s three-
decade existence by reconstructing the evolution of soci-
etal and journalistic meta-discourse about the participa-
tion of ordinary citizens in the news production process.
It is one of the central arguments that this desire
for a more authentic participatory community is inher-
ently political and is much older than the internet itself.
It can at least be traced back to the New Left’s call for
greater public involvement in politics and the more cir-
cumscribed call for a political, participatory journalism.
Oneof theNewLeft’smore general aims for participatory
democracy was “that society be organized to encourage
independence in men and provide the media for their
common participation” (Students for a Democratic So-
ciety, 1962). The Port Huron Statement further laid out
the institutional arrangement required for realizing this
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vision, which we would nowadays associate with partici-
patory media spaces, amongst other places:
Mechanisms of voluntary associationmust be created
through which political information can be imparted
and political participation encouraged....Institutions
should be created that engage people with issues
and express political preference,…which carry politi-
cal influence (appropriate to private, rather than pub-
lic, groupings) in national decision-making enterprise.
Private in nature, these should be organized around
single issues (medical care, transportation systems
reform, etc.), concrete interest (labor and minority
group organizations), multiple issues or general is-
sues.…They would be a significant politicizing and ed-
ucative force bringing people into touch with public
life and affording them means of expression and ac-
tion. (Students for a Democratic Society, 1962)
In an attempt to probe the discursive and political nexus
in which these various notions of participatory journal-
ism emerged and evolved, we follow in the footsteps
of Fred Turner’s research on the relationship between
the “hippie” values of 1960s and 70s California and
the early notion of a radically free, communalist inter-
net (Turner, 2006). We think there is a parallel, more
East Coast-oriented story to be told about how journal-
istic participation evolved and the way that the “do-it-
yourself” (DIY), radically anarchistic media production
of the 1990s, spawned, uneasily, today’s weaponized
meme-warfare and culture of “fake news”. In telling this
story we do not mean to condemn all varieties of partic-
ipatory journalism or to claim that they are all the same.
We do mean to complicate the history of journalistic par-
ticipation and thus further problematize this “participa-
tion” as a journalistic value and an underlying journalistic
epistemology. It is also important to note that it is not our
argument that there has been an inevitable “descent” of
participatory epistemology from utopian heights to a sor-
did and “dark” reality (Quandt, 2018). Rather, the conver-
sation surrounding journalistic participation has, indeed,
grown darker. But why, and to what end?
In this spirit, and in the pages below, we chronicle
four key discursive inflection points through four brief
genealogical case studies. We begin by briefly defining
what we mean by “participatory epistemology” and out-
lining how the normative value of “participation” was
fused with an epistemological and professional under-
standing of what participation meant for what journal-
ists could possibly “know”. We then turn to our first case
study, the Independent Media Center movement, a col-
lective of linked websites launched in 1999 in the after-
math of the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in
Seattle to provide coverage of anti-globalization protests
from an activist point of view. As one of the first websites
to allow news events to be uploaded to the world wide
web as they occurred (Anderson, 2013; Wolfson, 2015),
Indymedia would spawn a variety of affiliated “citizen
media” projects. This article discusses how Indymedia’s
primary accomplishment was to enable the fusion of DIY
cultures of craft production and identity-based commu-
nity media initiatives, both of which reached their peak
in the pre-internet days of the early 1990s.
Early DIY digital journalism work was largely the do-
main of the political left and was specifically framed in
opposition to professional journalism. Our website “will
focus on the protests, actions and issues ignored by con-
ventional media sources”, Indymedia organizers wrote.
Soon, however, professional journalism itself would at-
tempt to adopt a participatory mindset. In light of the
dire economic situation of legacy news organizations and
the loss of discursive influence with the rise of user-
generated and other news-like content, journalists in the
US were compelled to open up to more participatory
forms of communication around 2010, especially on Twit-
ter. Besides the possibility of live coverage, tweeting
meant that journalists, at the very least, could become
more personally involved and accessible to other users in
the process of creating news. But this did not exhaust so-
cial media’s participatory affordances, especially the role
assigned to citizens, not only as interlocutors but also
sources and co-creators of news.We discuss Andy Carvin
as a role model of this more expansive conception of par-
ticipatory journalism. In contrast to this, media scholars
were mostly dissatisfied with the adoption of social me-
dia in practice, which reflected fundamental tensions be-
tween participatory and professional cultures.
The importance of Twitter in the above narrative
highlights a third evolutionary change in our story—
the emergence of internet “platforms” as the dominant
mechanism of digital communication and the accompa-
nyingmassification-individualization of participatoryme-
dia making. With the growth of Facebook and Youtube
(and to a lesser extent, Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram)
creating and sharing journalistic content moved from a
fringe activity to a mass activity, with industrial level de-
velopments affecting formerly “alternative” media pat-
terns. While there is an entire academic genre of “plat-
form studies” (Bogost & Montfort, 2009; Gillespie, 2010;
Helmond, 2013), this piece analyzes this shift obliquely,
by briefly considering the career and ideological work
of Jonah Peretti, the founder of Buzzfeed and a key link
between older genres of media production and newer,
more capital-intensive notions of participatory produc-
tion and sharing.
Our final case study takes us up to the present day,
looking at how the conversation around participatory
platforms have again evolved in the aftermath of Brexit,
Donald Trump, and the rise of 4Chan and Reddit. While
platform power sat uneasily within older strands of pro-
duction that also valorized the actions of ideologically
committed citizens, the combined impact of populism,
propaganda, and misogyny have soured even the most
optimistic takes. Academic arguments about media and
participation have also broken out of their media stud-
ies cul-de-sac and are also now the domain of “more se-
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rious” branches of scholarship such as political commu-
nication and more critically minded researchers of race,
gender and social class. We conclude by reviewing these
developments and discussing some paths forward for fu-
ture scholarship.
2. What Is “Participatory Epistemology”?
The following pages largely discuss participation as a
normative ideal; that is, as a way of thinking about an
emerging relationship between citizens and journalists
that, over time, accreted a certain set of values. But au-
dience participation in the journalistic process also car-
ried with a particular understanding of what journalists
could reasonably know, and how their knowledge could
be enhanced by engaging with the public in order to pro-
duce journalistic work. Participatory epistemology, de-
fined here as a form of journalistic knowledge in which
professional expertise wasmodified through public inter-
action, was largely based on two separate but related
notions of how citizen engagement in the news process
could improve journalism. The first is largely “cybernetic”
in orientation and sees the relationship between news
producers, products, and consumers as part of a series
of feedback loops in which digital communication acts as
a functional bridge that improves the accuracy and rel-
evance of news products. The second is largely deliber-
ative, in which digital journalists are understood as em-
bedded in a “conversation” with citizens, one that pro-
duces a journalism more likely to incorporate the per-
spectives and points of view of ordinary people. Both
these epistemologies functionally denigrate traditional
journalistic knowledge, seeing it as inadequate or inca-
pable ofmaintaining its relevance in the 21st century dig-
ital media environment.
We now analyze how this participatory epistemol-
ogy, defined above, emerged and developed over time
by briefly looking at four case studies.
3. Indymedia and the DIY Moment
Once a major object of study amongst critically-inclined
journalism scholars and internet theorists, academic re-
search on the Indymedia phenomenon has waned in tan-
dem with the decline and disappearance of the move-
ment itself.1 In one of the earliest articles on Indymedia,
Platon and Deuze (2003, p. 337) described what they
called “a radical way of making, selecting and sharing
news...published on awebsite, which has possibilities for
archiving and structuring incoming news in a way that
traditional media (print, television and video) cannot”.
They and other early scholars chronicle an “open-source
news process” in which left-wing, largely anarchist me-
dia activists used both structured community participa-
tion (in the form of an “open newswire” to which any-
one could upload breaking news or political commen-
tary) and editorial oversight (with centrally and collec-
tively chosen “feature stories”) to create a participatory
news website particularly active during moments of po-
litical protest and unrest. At its peak Indymedia websites
existed in over 230 locations on six continents, with a
small group of regular editors providing curated content
touching on a variety of left-wing activist concerns and
a larger group of contributors congregating on the site
during local protest actions and moments of high polit-
ical drama (in New York City after September 11, 2001,
for instance). The flat structure of IMC network allowed
content to be shared across different sites and also en-
couraged a central website (indymedia.org) to act as a
content curator that could highlight different local sto-
ries. Since at least 2006, however, the network has ex-
perienced almost a complete collapse, with sites shut-
tering and many others existing in a sort of “ghost” sta-
tus. Ironically, the decentralized and anarchistic nature
of Indymedia governance makes actually closing these
potemkin sites difficult, making it difficult to determine
the exact health of the network. And although she argues
that the Indymedia experiment has not necessarily failed,
the most recent and optimistic scholarship on the topic
by Eva Giraud (2014, p. 420) admits that “[the] network
as a whole has declined”.
Despite being nourished by numerous intellectual
and technological predecessors (the list runs from the
participatory media philosophies of the Zapatista move-
ment in the 1990s to the BURN! Collective at the Uni-
versity of California San Diego; Wolfson, 2015) with the
benefit of hindsight it seems clear that Indymedia was
the first journalistic project to both emphasize the bene-
fits of “participatory journalism” and capture wider pub-
lic attention, particularly from other journalists. In part,
this attention was facilitated by a growing interest in the
participatory potentials and affordances of digital tech-
nology, which allowed networked and decentralized par-
ticipation in the journalistic process from a variety of ide-
ological actors. Wolfson, in fact, contends it was this fo-
cus on aggressively horizontal governance processes and
a fetishization of digital technology that lead to the ul-
timate failure of the Indymedia project, particular inso-
far as the core of the IMC neglected to engage in any
meaningful fashion with local activists and their long-
term community-based concerns. Indymedia, in short,
focused on politics and technology and neglected the
real work of building a grounded movement culture that
could be sustained over the long term (Wolfson, 2012).
We want to take slight issue with this conclusion in
a way that points both backwards and forwards towards
ourmain argument.With the benefit of hindsight and his-
tory, it seems clear that the primary accomplishment of
Indymedia (along with relatedmedia forms like blogging,
podcasting, and webzine production) was to bring “do-it-
yourself (DIY) maker politics” out of the realm of strictly
cultural practice and into the realm of both professional
1 In 2003 Google Scholar records 462 mentions of ‘Indymedia’. The scholarly citation rate reached 1020 mentions in 2010, with a steady decline to 531
mentions in 2017.
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journalism and “hard” politics. In other words, there was
a culture of Indymedia—a thin but globalized culture of
DIY practitioners who valorized small-scale craft produc-
tion in opposition to culture produced by corporations.
These “alternative media makers” included the produc-
ers of ‘zines, low-power radio, punk music, and commu-
nity newspapers. As Ratto andBoler (2014, p. 10; see also
Day, 2016) write:
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, DIY culture had
evolved with the innovative emergence of zines, a
significant cultural production practice of both punk
and third-wave feminist cultures....People around the
globewere enacting formsof protest anddirect action
that increasingly wedded art and politics....Indeed,
this conjunction between art and protest has only
snowballed over the ensuing decades; feminist artists
working in craft and activism, which continues the
legacy of DIY culture.
Indymedia, then was able to act as a discursive and
rhetorical bridge between these fairly marginal maker
communities and the larger, more powerful spheres of
digital technology and professional journalism. As Giraud
(2014, p. 425) notes:
Radical activist media projects such as Indymedia
gave momentum to a celebratory narrative that fore-
grounded the participatory potential of digital me-
dia [see, e.g., Allan, 2006; Castells, 1997; Gilmor,
2006], but the network’s position in that narrative
has since been displaced with discourses of “Twit-
ter revolutions”.
We would contend that it was not an accident that In-
dymedia was able to play this bridging role. It was, in
fact, deeply grounded in the culture of the platform it-
self. IMCs tapped into both an older (DIY) and emerg-
ing (techno-participatory) rhetoric that emphasized par-
ticipation as a leading value in and of itself in domains
of cultural production (the provision of small-scale con-
sumerist alternatives) personal self-actualization (the
pedagogic values of participatory culture, particularly in
politics) and structural journalism reform (the ability to
reduce the power of the corporate, ideologically blink-
ered media). And although these values aligned them-
selves to a resolutely left-of-center, anarchist politics,
such an affiliation was not a given—as the following sec-
tions will show.
In his influential overview of how the origins of Sili-
con Valley could be found, in part, in the libertarian val-
ues of the 1960s and 70s counter-culture, Fred Turner
draws our attention to the manner by which alternative
modes of living and creating often serve as the incuba-
tors and harbingers of decidedly more capitalistic enter-
prises. While our argument here is more restricted than
Turner’s deeply researched account,wewould argue that
the origins of the participatory journalism epistemology
might be found in a similar fusion of “do it yourself” val-
ues and anti-institutional politics, which itself might be
traceable back to its New Left origins and perhaps even
further. The next sections will elaborate the further (and
surprising) evolutions of this journalistic epistemology.
As blogs, podcasts, and other more digital formats of
news replaced organizations like Indymedia, and as the
rhetoric of do-it-yourself journalism increased in both
volume and stridency, professional news organizations
themselves were compelled to reckon with this partici-
patory journalistic turn.
4. Professional Adaptation to Participatory Practices
By the early 2000s, journalism was pushed from two di-
rections to adopt participatory practices. From above,
by the underfunded organizations employing them and
which were desperate for new sources of revenue and
relevance on theweb. From below, by the growing preva-
lence and increasing professionalization of blogs and
other online news ventures which grew out of open
source news production. Liberal political blogs in the
US, like Daily Kos or Talking Points Memo, and conserva-
tive blogs, like Drudge Report and Michelle Malkin, pro-
vided quick and opinionated takes on the news to grow-
ing audiences.
After establishing online news platforms in themid to
late 1990s,which initially followed traditional production
principles (Boczkowski, 2004), many legacy news organi-
zations started blogs in the mid-2000s. Aside from jour-
nalism itself, blogging was seen as a potential paradigm
shift for audience engagement in professional discourse:
When journalism becomes a process…audiences dis-
card their traditional role as passive consumers of
news and become empowered partners with a shared
stake in the end result. Weblogs offer one way to pro-
mote that kind of interactivity. (Lasica, 2003)
However, academic dissatisfaction with the practical im-
plementation of “j-blogs” was not uncommon. They
were often criticized as mere strategies to reassert gate-
keeping power rather than genuine attempts to en-
ter in a more engaged dialogue with the public (see
Singer, 2005).
When they established blogs, newspaper editors had
most likely their publications’ survival on their minds
rather than the enhancement of public dialogue. For
newspapers, the possibility of more immediately break-
ing and shaping the news through blogging represented
a promising response to the general diversion of atten-
tion on the web. They frequently accomplished this by
hiring bloggers, as did the Washington Post with Ezra
Klein in 2009 or the New York Times with Brian Stelter
in 2007. Bloggers brought with them not only necessary
practical skills, including the ability to quickly process
and produce great amounts of information, but also a
work ethic in which such “always on” production prac-
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tices were common. They also brought with them audi-
ences of their own.
But the real hope for a more open and public jour-
nalism happened with the rise of social networking
services—particularly Twitter. With its ability to organize
and generate discourse in small dosages and engagewith
other users directly and publicly, was seen as the breed-
ing ground for a new type of ambient journalism, which
Hermida (2010, p 298) conceived as an awareness sys-
tem that “provid[es] journalists with more complex ways
of understanding and reporting on the subtleties of pub-
lic communication”.
The scholarly literature at that time is defined by op-
timism (or at least recognition of the potential) regard-
ing the affordances of social media for more democrati-
cally valuable forms of journalism, marking a shift from
the earlier academic skepticism. To just give two exam-
ples: news production, Sue Robinson (2010, p. 141) pre-
dicted, “is moving from a hierarchal [sic], centralized,
one-to-many, unidirectional information flow to some-
thing more distributed, decentralized, poly-directional,
many-to-many, pattern”. Hermida (2012, p. 662) was
hopeful that “journalists adopt a more collaborative
method to determining the truth that, in theory, could
be reached through an iterative process played out on
networks such as Twitter”. To be sure, neither author
was blindly optimistic, but many scholars were certainly
more optimistic than seems warranted today (see, also,
Quandt, 2018).
Twitter’s user base grew from 30 to 117 million be-
tween 2010 and 2011 (Team, 2016). It was not only the
numbers, however, which brought Twitter on the map
but its role in key historical events in this period. The
excitement generated by the interactive and “witness-
ing” potentialities of Twitter (Zelizer, 2007; Peters, 2009)
helped generate a professional and technological dis-
course around a new, archetypical professional journal-
ist with both traditional news and socialmedia credibility.
Enter Andy Carvin, whose Twitter feed surged to promi-
nence during the Arab Spring in 2011 and who had been
a social media strategist at NPR since 2006. Carvin had
made a name of himself as an internet activist and had
been involved in early efforts to bridge digital divides
and integrate the internet into school education in the
late 1990s, aswell as several citizen journalism initiatives,
particularly after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.
The role Carvin assumed during the uprisings in the
Middle East was that of a curator, which consisted of
sourcing and assessing information by means of a large
network of citizens and other journalists (Hermida, Lewis,
& Zamith, 2014). Though he curated remotely from the
US, it was often emphasized that he had on-the-ground
travel experience in Tunisia and Egypt. For media schol-
ars who have long criticized journalism’s over-reliance
on official sources (Gans, 1979/2004; Sigal, 1973; Tuch-
man, 1978), Carvin’s preference of “alternative voices”
met normative expectations. He epitomized a kind of jour-
nalismwhich engages in “collaborative verification, trans-
parency and co-creation”while conforming to established
professional norms but performing more humbly and
“open about the limits of his reporting” (García de Torres
& Hermida, 2017, pp. 177, 190, italics in the original).
Trade publications, such as Nieman Journalism Lab,
agreed and saw his work as having “turned curation into
an art form, and it’s provided a hint of what news can
look like in an increasingly networked media environ-
ment” (Garber, 2011). A portrait in Columbia Journalism
Review, titled Is This the World’s Best Twitter Account?
(Silverman, 2011), listed several tweets which exempli-
fied how Carvin engages his social network on Twitter,
using it as direct sources or to confirm or explain infor-
mation he received, while carefully noting the status of
its confirmation. Most importantly, in the process of ver-
ification his role was to ascribe journalistic credibility to
public information.
All was not simply pure utopianism, however, par-
ticularly in the realm of digital scholarship about social
media. Under the surface of the happy and democratic
ambient journalism, a broader disillusionment around
the absent or insufficient enhancement and equalization
of democratic discourse through the internet (Hindman,
2009), was also emerging. Some scholars criticized jour-
nalism blogs as means to extend proven ways of doing
journalism and to maintain gatekeeping power (Robin-
son, 2006; Singer, 2005). Journalism researchers found
similar tendencies with Twitter (Molyneux & Mourão,
2017; Parmelee, 2013), though some to a lesser extent
(Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2012), which suggests that the
normalization diagnosis can be attributed more to insti-
tutional inertia than steadfast institutional resistance to
participatory practices.
To sum up, popular and scholarly narratives about
the value of participation in this period were still influ-
enced by the early utopian visions of the internet; specif-
ically, the notion that the liberatory power of the inter-
net would sweep away hardened anti-democratic iner-
tia of professional journalism. However, the vision that
through social media a more public journalism would
emerge was quickly paired with dissatisfaction about the
practical implementation of this vision. This dissatisfac-
tion keyed into an established theme of media criticism,
which has been taking issue with journalism’s incessant
reliance on elite sources and its insufficient openness to
citizen for at least three decades. This found further sup-
port by evidence that suggest persistent dominance of of-
ficial sources in times ofmore technology-enabled event-
driven news (Livingston & Bennett, 2003).
In addition, and finally, Twitter was not simply a
website on the internet; it was a social media platform,
and Andy Carvin made his participatory name accord-
ing to the rules and affordances of that platform. The
importance of the platform nature of Twitter—and of
platforms in general, and how they played into larger
changes in the notion of participation and journalism—
will become clearer in the next section. It is with this
transition that the changes in the journalistic episte-
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mology of participation become both institutionalized
and problematic.
5. Buzzfeed, Virality, and the Path to Platforms
In 2013, the internet got a good laughwhen it discovered
that Jonah Peretti, founder of the website Buzzfeed, had
once attended the University of Santa Cruz, had hung
around its’ famous History of Consciousness program,
and wrote an academic article on Deleuze, Guattari, and
the production of consumer identity in late capitalism. In-
sofar as Buzzfeed (then best known for its viral headlines
and content like “42 Pieces of Definitive Proof That You
Might Possibly Be Armenian”) regularly produced iden-
tity creating and consumer-oriented content, observers
inclined toward irony wondered if Deleuze and Guattari
could be seen as having inspired the latest wave of digi-
tal media and journalism. Around this time, and in part
by following the example of new Buzzfeed model of me-
dia production, participatory interaction with journalis-
tic and media content was largely reduced to “sharing”
(John, 2013), “forwarding”, “commenting on”, and so on.
This viral orientation, however, itself depended on quasi-
participatory media platforms like Facebook and Twitter
for its’ reach and ultimate financial success or failure.
Buzzfeed thus both prefigured the orientation of the sec-
ond and far more meaningful wave of participatory me-
dia practice, as well as found itself structurally depen-
dent on these corporate, participatory platforms. In this
sense, the career of Jonah Peretti can serve as in insight-
ful window into the transition between the earlier, more
utopian discourses characterized by the first two case
studies, with the more dystopian discursive turn in the
years that followed.
Despite the chuckles evinced by the knowledge that
the founder of a highly successful digital website had
once been something of a left-wing theory poseur, the
relevantmoments of Peretti’s career to the epistemology
of participation can actually be found elsewhere. These
moments include his time at the MIT Media Lab (during
which he created the “Nike viral sweatshop logo” meme
that would launch his career), his later tenure at Eye-
beam (the New York City-based digital arts organization),
and finally, the often-fraught relationship between Buz-
zfeed’s quality journalism and Facebook. Peretti’s time
at UC Santa Cruz can be seen as the “Counterculture to
Cyberculture-esque” link between Peretti’s career and
the world of Silicon Valley; his later years might be seen
as the creation of an East Coast, journalism, and old-
media variation of that same story.
Peretti first rocketed to media attention in 2005
when he created the “Nike Sweatshop Email”, which in-
volved him trying to convince Nike’s lawyers to personal-
ize his pair of Shoes with the word “Sweatshop”, a satire
that drew attention to Nike factory working conditions
and landed Peretti on Good Morning America and other
media shows. At the time, as Peretti writes, hewas at the
MIT Media Lab:
Procrastinating writing my thesis[,] I visited the Nike
ID website to check out the shoe personalization tech-
nology….The site was trumpeting the service as being
about freedom and I thought this was ironic consider-
ing the way the shoes are actually made. That is how
I got the idea to order a pair of running shoes cus-
tomized with the word “sweatshop”. (Chung, 2005)
By publicizing the rather deadpan and exchange of
emails with Nike, Peretti’s political stunt “went viral”, a
phrase which was not widely known in 2005. The experi-
ence led him towards a general interest in the qualities of
digital media content that could lead to a rapid diffusion
across a social network, and also to founding a second
specific project, “The Contagious Media Project”, house
at the NYC based digital arts collective Eyebeam. The
activities of the Contagious Media Group were eventu-
ally featured in a “Contagious Media” exhibition at New
York City’s New Museum, curated by Peretti and his sis-
ter, the comedian Chelsea, and included digital artworks
like “Black People Love Us” (a parody of condescend-
ing white urbanites attitudes toward African-Americans),
“The Rejection Line”, (an answeringmachine number you
could give to an unwanted solicitor at a bar or party), and
the story of the original Nike email. By the moment the
ContagiousMedia project debuted, however, Peretti had
moved on to establish theHuffington Postwithmedia en-
trepreneur and sometime political gadfly Arianna Huffin-
gton. From the Huffington Post Peretti would go on to es-
tablish Buzzfeed, where he would put his years of study-
ing viral media to commercial use.
The commercial potential of the viral media exper-
iments is obvious in retrospect; what is remarkable is
how edgy and experimental they seemed at the time—
experimental enough to be featured in a major New
York City museum. But not everyone was impressed. As
Tom Moody, a NYC artist, musician, and sometime Eye-
beam volunteer wrote in his memories of Peretti’s time
at Eyebeam:
I remember [Corey] Arcangel telling me about his
contagious media group that met once a week, or
month. I thought it sounded, to use a term from the-
ory, “deeply full of shit”. I understood that a busi-
ness person or advertiser might want to study viral
flow but why would an artist care about that? So you
could goose your own stats? Make better animated
GIFs? This was 2004. Peretti left Eyebeam to do terri-
ble work at the Huffington Post and then terrible work
at Buzzfeed. (Moody, 2014)
The final development in this transition from what we
might call a “boutique” to a “mass market” understand-
ing of participatory journalistic values can be seen in the
manner by which the values of Buzzfeed, with its promis-
cuousmix of high-level investigative journalism, viral con-
tent, and participatory sharing, intersected with the in-
stitutions that were just beginning to colonize the me-
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dia landscape in the mid 2010s—platforms (Bogost &
Montfort, 2009; Gillespie, 2010; Helmond, 2015). These
platforms—which include Twitter but are dominated by
YouTube and Facebook—represent the full flowering of
the participatory ethos insofar as their entire operational
model depends on users voluntarily producing and shar-
ingmedia content about themselves, their personal lives,
and their beliefs. For news organizations that make use
of these platforms, the key question is how to crack the
algorithmic code in a way that contribute to the bot-
tom line.
Perhaps some of these darker developments were
foreshadowed in Peretti’s earliest work. Black People
Love Us, in particular, provoked a number of extreme
and hostile reactions across the political spectrum, lead-
ing Peretti to conclude that “you can’t pick your au-
dience” when you depend on virality for distribution.
While the website was designed to critique subtle racism
and clueless comments made by white Americans with
African-American friends:
The site eventually spread to message boards run
by white power groups who were outraged by the
pictures of whites and blacks socializing. I started to
get threatening phone calls from angry KKK members
in the middle of the night. “May I please speak to
Johnny?” one of them asked in a polite southern ac-
cent, and then he broke into a racist, expletive filled
death threat. (Chung, 2005)
Despite the common tendency to see participatory me-
dia as an unallowed good, even in the high days of par-
ticipatory platforms, it was clear that darker and more
illiberal forces were lurking on the horizon. We turn to a
discussion of those forces in the final main section.
6. Participatory Apocalypse: Pepe the Frog
The realization that capitalism has fully captured the in-
ternet was to be expected and is in itself an insufficient
explanation for the most recent deflation of the value
of participation. Despite the fact that platform owners
learned to thoroughly monetize user engagement and
steer it in directions to make it even more profitable
(van Dijck, 2013), a certain faith in the progressive polit-
ical potential of participatory media remained. Liberals
still easily squared the possibility of promoting a more
inclusive and democratic society by means of the inter-
net with doing this in the service of the Mark Zucker-
bergs of this world and their shareholders. Awareness
of dark corners of the internet notwithstanding, civic life
was mostly not affected by them. In media scholarship,
anti-democratic capabilities of social media were mostly
explored in the context of semi-authoritarian regimes
(Howard & Parks, 2012).
McDonald’s (2015) discussion of the conflicting orien-
tations of digital culture captures an ambiguity of partic-
ipation which has long ripened and would soon spread
its more acerbic flavor: on the one hand, there is the
“radical transparency” promoted by Facebook, on the
other hand the collaborative initiatives exemplified by
Anonymous—involving masking (iconographical as well
as identificatory), embracing the ephemeral and the
grotesque, and memeification. We are now in a much
better (or worse) position to see different combinations
of these twoorientations: circulation of destructive ideas
on “radically transparent” platforms, untraceable and de-
tached from their unidentifiable originators; sowing con-
flict and destruction of reputation of people who are
(personally or professionally) compelled to expose them-
selves on social media; etc. Peretti’s experience with
“Black People Love Us” has come to dominate participa-
tory media space.
The rising problem consciousness of trolling and
memeification in the context of various right-wing pop-
ulist campaigns, particularly the 2016 US presiden-
tial election, has devalued participation in journalism.
Rather than voicing citizens’ concerns and fostering rea-
soned dialogue, the internet now appeared to drown out
these voices and only amplify the most outrageous and
obnoxious. The consequences of this, however, were not
merely understood discursively. As Ryan Milner told The
Guardian,what the Pizzagate conspiracy exemplifiedwas
“that playful buzzing participation…[may turn] into real
consequences” (Wilson, 2017). The ironically distanced
and boundary-crossing pose of the troll (Phillips, 2015)
paved the way for loose alliances between citizens, cam-
paign strategists, and political radicals generating atten-
tion and solidarities through memes with ambiguous
messages. This created a sense in journalism that the par-
ticipating public could no longer be trusted and that it
perhaps should not even trust itself: “With every election
cycle, the citizenry seems to amass more and more tools
for bending the online political narrative to their will—or
to feel as if they’re doing so, anyway”, reflected Amanda
Hess (2016) about this loose alliance, which Republicans
have become most effective at exploiting, four days be-
fore Trump was elected.
What gave the residual optimism about participation
described earlier the deathblow was the rise of the alt-
right from the depths of Reddit, 4chan, and 8chan, pro-
moted by a newer sector of the media industry special-
izing in outrage (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014), and consoli-
dated around memes. Meme culture has taken a life of
its own. It developed principles and forms of assigning
value to its products as symbolic objects and thus fol-
lowed how other fields of cultural production differen-
tiate (Bourdieu, 1993). This is evidenced by the vigor
of critical meta-discourse—whose existence is particu-
larly pronounced in ascending media fields (Jacobs &
Townsley, 2017)—on such platforms as the internet mag-
azine Meme Insider or the subreddit Meme Economy.
This meme-appraising meta-discourse not only formed
collective identity (Gal, Shifman, & Kampf, 2015) but in
assigning worth and establishing hierarchies structured
the symbolic economy of meme production (Literat &
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VandenBerg, 2017).With the foundationof its own stock
exchange NASDANQ in 2017, meme culture is crossing
the threshold to a “real” economy.
We argue that the later career of Pepe the Frog,
a cartoon character who has risen to infamy as one
of the most prevalent symbols of the alt-right and a
weapon in the meme warfare of the 2016 US presiden-
tial election, is paradigmatic for this stage in the life
cycle of participation. Characterized by his creator as
a humanoid “chill frog-dude” with a stoner face who
liked peeing with his pants down to his ankles (Furie,
2016), Pepe was conceived as anything but a symbol
of hate. With the catchphrase “feels good man”, Pepe’s
memeification began with emotive commentary, first in
the original joyous sense, then in different alterations
attached to various emotional states (Triple Zed, 2015).
The meme circulated through the internet, from fringe
sub-cultures to celebrities. When presidential candidate
Trump retweeted a Pepe depicting himself in October of
2015, apparently strategically utilizing the connotation
of this symbol, while the alt-right used Pepe not only to
spread their propaganda but also to support their candi-
date, the association seemed undeniable and the meme
got fully politicized.
By mid 2016, Pepe was considered a symbol of white
nationalism in different news reports. The Daily Beast
quoted a self-proclaimed “anonymous white nationalist”
in a story published onMay 26, 2015 who asserted there
was a campaign to remove the symbol from mainstream
culture and claim it for the alt-right by purposely connect-
ing Pepe with Nazi propaganda (Nuzzi, 2016). Violent
and clearly anti-Semitic Pepes, with swastikas and other
more or less coded Nazi propaganda messages, gained
attention and were discussed in various news reports.
It is an understatement to treat racist Pepes and
other user-generated right-wing vitriol during the presi-
dential campaign as propaganda. In the demonstrative
breaching of established cultural norms (what conser-
vatives often deride as political correctness) they are
part of a concerted attack on democratic consensus—
understood as shared categories of purity and impurity
through which people express and legitimize themselves
in public (Alexander, 2006). The threat of continuous
breaching of speech norms may constitute less a sus-
tained switching of these cultural codes, which is what
the liberal outrage against it conjures; besides outrage
fatigue, the immediate threat is that by performatively
embracing impure codes distracts from relatively mun-
dane transgression of democratic principles (e.g., day-to-
day racism).
Considering the growing body of media scholarship
on this topic, we can see that the meaning attached to
memes themselves have changed because of their role
in consolidating the alt-right. Not too long ago, memes
were discussed in terms of mostly politically innocent hu-
mor (Davison, 2012), viral marketing (Guadagno, Rem-
pala, Murphy, & Okdie, 2013), as means to generate po-
litical dialogue (Milner, 2013) or form collective iden-
tities (Gal et al., 2015). More recently, the focus has
shifted towards more divisive and democratically cor-
rosive manifestations of this cultural form (Ludemann,
2018; Topinka, 2017; Sparby, 2017). As a prime exam-
ple of a symbol modified and reinterpreted by peer-
production, this has shed a much more pessimistic light
on participation. As Topinka’s study of the subreddit
r/ImGoingToHellForThis demonstrated, “user-generated
content on participatory media can establish and pro-
mote racism and nationalism without requiring the sanc-
tion of an established publisher” (Topinka, 2017, p. 17).
What seems to resonate with this more pessimistic out-
look on participatory media is a peculiar sense of nostal-
gia for the Network era—a time of greater political con-
sensus in American society—particular in arguments crit-
ical of the so-called filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011), which
have been recently powerfully refuted (Bakshy, Messing,
& Adamic, 2015) or qualified (Faris et al., 2017).
Not only through active user engagement but sim-
ply by the fact how we can witness political discourse
through them, participatory media have contributed to
a heightened sense of polarization, affecting loyalties
for and resentments against others, how citizens inter-
act (and perhaps more importantly not interact) with
each other, their decisions, including on who to vote
for. Supported by evidence from political ethnographies
(Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016), Polletta and Callahan
(2017) argued that white working-class resentment may
be less about whether people have themselves experi-
enced or witnessed discrimination than being part of
stories which people like them share with each other
about being discriminated. These stories get confirmed
bymedia commentators who havemade a business from
telling their audience what other people think about
them (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014).
Efforts to reappropriate Pepe, above all by the
#SavePepe campaign launched by Pepe’s creator Matt
Furie himself, have so far been unsuccessful.2 But there
are also more hopeful prospects: With the impact of the
#MeToo movement—effectively consolidated attention
around the prevalence and persistence of sexual harass-
ment and assault, encouraging mostly women to speak
out about their experience, and holding sexual preda-
tors accountable—participation may be viewed again in
a more nuanced, if not completely redeemed way.
7. Conclusion
The current meme-drenched political battles in the US
and elsewhere shed light on three items we have ap-
proached through our case studies in this article: the
relationship between participation, status, and identity,
the dynamics affecting the relationship between main-
stream and participatory journalism, and the political
2 At the moment of writing this article, Furie has sued Infowars for copyright infringement for using Pepe in a poster which was sold on the site’s online
store (Sommerlad, 2018).
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role of counter-publics and subaltern movements and
their relationship to participatory culture.
One of Jonah Peretti’s deepest insights (one that in-
fluenced both the viral tendencies of 21st century jour-
nalism as well as journalism’s relationship toward the
platform power of Facebook and Twitter) was the link
he drew between participation and identity. Perhaps
most ironic about meme culture of the political right
is that, even as it trades on breaching mainstream cul-
tural norms and stylizing itself as culturally progressive
and radical, it rigorously polices its own locutionary con-
ventions, despite the ever-evolving rules of meme dis-
course (Milner, 2013; Miltner, 2014). Analogous to the
pressure to refine cultural tastes in order to maintain
classmembership (Bourdieu, 1984), status inmeme com-
munities is elusive and members need to continuously
refine and perform their cultural proficiency since illiter-
acy and breaking of conventions leads to scorns and ex-
clusion (Nissenbaum & Shifman, 2015).
To add further irony, this moment also realized one
of themore hopeful visions of theorists of subaltern pub-
lic spheres (Fraser, 1992; Habermas, 1996; Jacobs, 2000):
communicative spaces in which shared interests can be
formed and from which they can (ideally) be asserted in
the dominant public sphere when pertinent normative
questions are at stake. Dismissing the interests of Trump
supporters as false consciousness does not detract from
the uncomfortable reality that the internet gave many
people the opportunity to find and express their previ-
ously unheard voices and make them heard, including
by reproducing and modifying racist memes. Indymedia,
as we have seen, was one of the earliest progenitors
of these developments, promiscuously mixing participa-
tion, political identity, and agonistic politics, and deeply
influencing journalism as a result.
Traditional journalism, finally, has been deeply di-
vided by these developments. On a professional level,
what should the relationship between journalists and
citizen participants be? In economic terms, should jour-
nalists make use of amateur content in order to save
money, and what are the institutional consequences if
they do so? Politically, finally, how ought journalists rec-
oncile the agonistic tendencies of citizen participation
(discussed above) and their own traditional roles as neu-
tral brokers between different ideological perspectives?
Should journalists become more political themselves?
Does using a piece of Indymedia content mean that jour-
nalists endorse and anarchistic, anti-global perspective?
How about something featuring Pepe the Frog? Does
it matter that one perspective is of the left, and one
that is of the right? Why? What does this difference say
about the potentially latent political tendencies of pro-
fessional journalism?
Considering the history of participatory journalism
across this longer time frame can, finally, help us get a
better sense of how politics and media have changed
across the arc of the early 21st century. Through the
lens of the often unexpected and unanticipated devel-
opments discussed in the previous section, we can get
a sense of the different ways the cultural values and
epistemologies of media making have refracted, split,
and transformed. In order to meet the challenge of
the present day—with its’ problems both political and
journalistic—we must know both where we have been
and where we are going, and do so in relation to one of
the dominant ideological impulses—that impulse to par-
ticipate—of the digital age.
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